It’s well-settled that lawyers can’t add, but when they become witnesses, they really throw themselves into the job. Ex-Ch J L. Paige (“Ironfist”) Marvel surveys the expert’s report of G, Esq., and finds only two (count ’em, two) sentences that provide legal conclusions. Those she strikes.

“As an initial matter, notwithstanding petitioners’ dim view of licensed attorneys, ‘merely being a lawyer does not disqualify one as an expert witness. Lawyers may [even] testify as to legal matters when those matters involve questions of fact.’ Askanase v. Fatjo, 130 F.3d 657, 672 (5th Cir. 1997); see also Estate of Climer v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-29, 1994 WL 17919, at *8–9 (discussing expert testimony provided by two real estate attorneys in relation to a deed).” Richard B. Stillahn & Lisa R. Lang Stillahn, Docket No. 13492-20, filed 2/12/25, at p. 3.

Oh, the two offending sentences?

“We agree with petitioners in two limited respects, however. Page 45 of the G Report states in part in relation to certain transactions in which petitioners engaged, ‘There does not appear to be a legitimate business purpose to enter into this type of arrangement.’ Page 62 of the G Report states in part, ‘The deferral of income taxes appears to be the purpose of this arrangement . . . .’ Statements about a transaction’s legitimacy or a taxpayer’s subjective purpose fall outside the proper scope of an expert witness’s role.  We will strike these statements from the record, just as we would strike them if they had been made at trial. Cf. Rule 143(g)(2) (stating that an expert witness report is generally ‘received in evidence as the direct testimony of the expert witness’). We do not, however, view these isolated statements as detracting from the overall character of the G Report as a helpful and reliable analysis of installment sales and other transactions.” Order, at p. 9. (Citation, name, and footnote omitted).

The expert’s report goes in.