Not syndicated conservation easements, just another case of the Raytheonista sig ints trying to wriggle out of the Section 7121s they signed, giving up their Foreign Earned Income exclusions. These were the experts stationed at Pine Gap, in the Far Outback.

Michael W. Aubin and Kerry A. Aubin, T. C. Memo. 2024-9, filed 1/23/24, features Mike trying to toss the agreement he signed. Judge James S (“Big Jim”) Halpern isn’t buying.

“…petitioners submitted a Motion in Limine, asking that we ‘exclude the Closing Agreement from evidence for the time being.’ Petitioners appeared to argue that the closing agreement was not subject to the business records exception to the hearsay rule, Rule 803(6) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, because ‘the source of the Closing Agreement and circumstances surrounding it lack trustworthiness.’ In support of that argument, petitioners referred to testimony in another case before the Court that, by their description, raised the possibility of forgery of signatures of Pine Gap employees on closing agreements such as Mr. Aubin’s. ‘Based on these circumstances suggesting fraud and criminality regarding signatures on the purported Closing Agreements,’ petitioners advised us, Mr. Aubin ‘no longer stipulates that he signed the purported Closing Agreement.'” T. C. Memo. 2024-9, at p. 6.

Except.

Rule 91(e) only lets you out of a stip if the parties agree, or if the Judge allows it “if justice requires.”

“We are unpersuaded that, if allegations of forgery have been made in another case, ‘manifest injustice” would result from holding petitioners to their stipulation that Mr. Aubin signed Exhibit 3-J. Forgery sometimes occurs. That prospect is not new information. But Mr. Aubin knows—or certainly should know—whether he signed Exhibit 3-J. Petitioners stipulated that he did. Tellingly, in seeking to withdraw that stipulation, petitioners do not deny that Mr. Aubin signed the agreement. They seem to want to use the allegations of forgery in another case as an excuse to place on respondent the burden of establishing Exhibit 3-J’s authenticity. Requiring respondent to prove facts within petitioners’ knowledge would be contrary to Rule 91(a)’s mandate that parties stipulate relevant matters ‘to the fullest extent to which complete or qualified agreement can or fairly should be reached.’ Justice thus does not require putting respondent to the task of establishing what petitioners have already stipulated—particularly when they make no claim that the stipulation is incorrect. Simply put, that forgery may have occurred in another case does not justify relieving petitioners of their stipulation that it did not occur in this case.” T. C. Memo. 2023-9, at pp. 7-8. (Footnote omitted.)

And that the agreement covers years beyond the year in which it was signed is irrelevant, as Section 7121(a) says the agreement may address “any taxable period,” past, passing, or to come.

And the signoff for the IRS came from the officer designated to administering the US-Australian tax treaty. He don’t need no delegation order. And his assistant has a file memo and e-mail confirmation of authority to sign for her boss.

Taishoff says it’s about time to retire this old protester argument. Maybe a couple Section 6673 chops (hi, Judge Holmes) might do the trick.

IRS gets partial summary J.

Well, at least it’s a change from the Dixieland variety.