Madeleine L’Engle’s 1962 young adult classic sums up the arguments of Jacob & Marsha Rozbruch, Docket No. 16739-19L, filed 2/3/23. Jacob & Marsha claim Appeals abused its discretion by not confining its review on remand to the financial information Jacob & Marsha submitted four (count ’em, four) years earlier. Judge David Gustafson remanded with an order to reconsider Jacob’s & Marsha’s claim of CNC “taking into account all of petitioners’ income, expenses, assets, and liabilities as reported by petitioners in their supporting financial documentation.” Order, at p. 5.

Jacob & Marsha had settled a bunch deficiencies and TFRPs (hi, Judge Holmes) with DOJ, but those aren’t in play, except for a now-expired wage garnishment. They had run up an additional $700K of deficiencies and TFRPs, but submitted no new financials, claiming the old stuff was all Appeals could consider.

Judge David Gustafson is extremely well-bred.

“Our remand order can be construed to instruct IRS Appeals to include in its consideration the Rozbruchs’ information ‘as [previously] reported’—but it cannot reasonably be construed to allow consideration of only that previous information. Our instruction was to ‘take[] into account’ that information in the process of  ‘reconsider[ing] petitioners’ financial circumstances.’ Assuming that there might sometimes be an occasion in which, in a remand order, the Court has the discretion to confine IRS Appeals to an existing record, we did not so confine IRS Appeals here;  and it would have been very odd to do so in this situation. The relief that the Rozbruchs request is the status of ‘currently not collectible’; but the remand as they conceive it would have the IRS determine whether to forestall collection (and would have the Court review that determination) on the basis of a showing that they were not collectible four years ago—i.e., to determine not that they are currently not collectible but that they were previously not collectible. Of course, financial information in a CDP hearing can never be up to the minute, but a four-year lag would undermine the logic of CNC.” Order, at p. 11.

CNC means currently not collectible. That status applies at the moment, based upon the current state of financial affairs. Summary J for IRS.

Jacob’s & Marsha’s trusty attorney is an alumnus of The Jersey Boys, whose never-say-die attitude I’ve chronicled here before.

This variation of the Michael Corleone gambit, “don’t ask me about my business,” is played today by Thiele Kaolin Co., KaMin, LLC , Imerys USA, Inc. and Imerys Minerals USA, Inc., and Arcilla Mining and Land Co., LLC. All nonparties, they are seeking to quash IRS subpoenae (this is Judge Patrick J (“Scholar Pat”) Urda’s case, of course) that ask the nonparties about their business.

The case is J L Minerals, LLC, Beasley Timber Management, LLC, Tax Matters Partner, Docket No. 17076-21, filed 2/2/23, who claimed a $16 million conservation easement deduction on the usual GA boondockery they bought for $1.6 million a year-and-a-half before taking the deduction.

The nonparty subjects of the subpoenae are the only miners of kaolin, a clay used “to produce paper, porcelain, paints, and other products.” Order, at p. 1. IRS wants 14 (count ’em, 14). categories of information from the nonparties covering three years. The J Ls claim the boondocks are stuffed with valuable kaolin.

The nonparties claim ” that the subpoenae sought broad swaths of confidential and potentially privileged information that would upend the kaolin market, which is small (there are only three major processors – Thiele, KaMin, and Imerys), secretive, and subject to government scrutiny (as a check against price-fixing). The nonparties asserted that the breadth of the requested information only a few weeks before trial presented a particular burden given that, with one exception, the nonparties had no connection to the issues before the Court.” Order, at pp. 2-3. (Footnote omitted, but it says years before KaMin leased the land to mine it).

Judge Scholar Pat says citizens must help the Government, but he’ll narrow the subpoenae to only the year at issue, and provide firewalls to protect confidential information. The nonparties are the only game in town when it comes to kaolin, and that would help Judge Scholar Pat figure this out, so they have to dish somewhat. IRS is not pulling a last-minute desperation search for a case, nor is this coming at the end of a long trial.

So the nonparties can testify by Zoomiegram for no more than 3 hours each, and while they needn’t provide paper, they must be prepared to testify about contracts, policies and procedures.

Amanasu Environment Corporation, Docket No. 5192-20L, filed 2/1/23, finally got the NOD more than thirty days after mailing, although an attempt to deliver was made five (count ’em, five) days before the thirty day clock ran on petitioning the NOD. Amanasu says the NOD was addressed wrong, to “Vanclover BC V6R1E4,” rather than “Vancouver BC V6R1E4,” Order, at p. 2. And that error may have impeded and delayed delivery, as IRS can’t show how Canada Post handles and delivers mail, including without limitation the name of the postie who was on duty that day, Order, at p. 3, footnote 3.

Amanasu amends its petition to raise Boechler, P. C., equitable tolling. That’s good enough for ex-Ch J L. Paige (“Iron Fist”) Marvel to toss IRS’ summary J motion. Question of fact whether delayed delivery prejudiced Amanasu.

OK, so maybe Ch J Kathleen (“TBS = The Big Shillelagh”) Kerrigan might consider whether a two (count ’em, two) day delay in receipt of Deirdre’s petition prejudiced IRS. Deirdre Lenz, Docket No. 33904-21, filed 2/1/23, used FedEx 2 Day AM, to send in her petition on the last day. Of course, FedEx 2 Day AM is not one of the “blessed communion, fellowship divine” in Notice 2016-30, 2016-18 I.R.B. 676, effective April 11, 2016, and therefore gets no benefit from Section 7502 mailed-is-filed. Deirdre says “… she was unable to reach any person by telephone at the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and consequently ‘was not aware that there were postal delivery options that were unacceptable by the IRS.’” Order, at p. 3.

Deirdre, don’t feel like the Lone Ranger. Reaching IRS by phone can be an expedition.

So what’s the difference?