Reste tranquille, enfants de la patrie, your national holiday hasn’t changed, but Steve Mnuchin and the Treasury Munchkins have extended more than the due date of your 1040NRs, and that of the 1040s of the rest of us.

Here’s Notice 2020-23, 4/9/20, with good news for the dilatory, quarantined and isolated who are trying to petition, or otherwise wet-ink via snail mail or PDS, the Glasshouse Gang, while the Glasshouse Gang aren’t receiving mail.

“Affected Taxpayers also have until July 15, 2020, to perform all Specified Time-Sensitive Actions, that are due to be performed on or after April 1, 2020, and before July 15, 2020. This relief includes the time for filing all petitions with the Tax Court, or for review of a decision rendered by the Tax Court, filing a claim for credit or refund of any tax, and bringing suit upon a claim for credit or refund of any tax. This notice does not provide relief for the time period for filing a petition with the Tax Court, or for filing a claim or bringing a suit for credit or refund if that period expired before April 1, 2020.” Notice, at p. 8.

An Affected Taxpayer is any person (see Reg. Section 7701(a)(1)) who has or had to file a return or anything else on or after 4/1/20 and before 7/15/20, and who is covered under the current COVID-19 emergency declaration of 3/13/20.

My colleague Peter Reilly, CPA, asked why I hadn’t blogged this. I’d seen the Notice, but I thought the blogosphere and the trade press would be all over this.

The weekly IRS e-news for tax professionals hasn’t hit my inbox yet, and I had expected that e-news would have tipped off everybody. Apparently not.

Thanks again, Mr Reilly. Stay safe, stay strong, and the rest of you go and do likewise.

Edited to add: Of course, even if the clock ran, one could always try equitable tolling. See my blogpost “For Whom The Equitable Tolls,” 4/9/20.

Further edited to add: But the explicit Section 6213 language, with the stay of collection, makes the 90-150 day limitation on petitioning a SNOD jurisdictional. Likewise Section 6015(e)(1)(A) slams the ninety day-six month door on innocent spousery. Yet maybe, just maybe, Sections 6320 and 6330 lien-levy CDP petitions might could slide under the tag. See Myers DC Cir opinion at p. 20: “Although this Circuit is the first to decide whether Section 7623(b)(4) is jurisdictional in nature, we recognize that our holding is in some tension with that of another circuit regarding a similarly worded provision of the Internal Revenue Code 26 USC §6330(d)(1).” But DC Cir says notwithstanding other learning, including our old pal Guralnik, the statutory language is the same for petitions from NODs in CDPs as for whistleblower NODs. Of course, watch out for statutory stay language in Section 6330(e)(1); that’s a tripwire for a landmine that might blow your case sky-high. So ya pays yer money and yer takes yer chances.

I don’t generally (love that word!) follow Tax Court cases on appeal to the USCCAs. I leave that to the blogosphere and the trade press. They have the personnel and time to keep watch over that flock by night and day.

But today Judge Tamara Ashford has gotten David T. Myers, 2151-15W, filed 4/10/20 back from DC Cir on R&R, and that’s no holiday package. It’s Reversed & Remanded. All my readers (dwindling in numbers each day under the brunt of COVID-19) will remember David T as an epistolary warrior with the Ogden Sunseteers over the opacity of their purported shootdowns.

If you don’t, then see my blogpost “Forms and Letters,” 6/5/17.

Well, last year DC Cir decided that the Section 7623(b)(4) thirty-day cutoff to petition an OS shootdown is not jurisdictional, and maybe so David T, an humble pro se, should get the benefit of equitable tolling. Equitable tolling means SOL affirmative defense doesn’t bar a claim in cases where the petitioner, despite use of due diligence, could not or did not discover the injury until after the expiration of SOL. Like the sponge left in the patient cases.

And even though Section 7623 is not overly protective of blowers, which is one of the usual standards, “(T)hat the whistleblower statute is not unusually protective of claimants is the only consideration on the IRS side of the ledger. Without more, we are not persuaded to set aside a presumption that has been so consistently applied. See e.g., Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 49 (2002). ‘It is hornbook law that limitations periods are subject to equitable tolling.’ (cleaned up).” Myers v. Com’r, No. 18-1003, filed 7/2/19 (DC Cir), at p. 22.

So now Judge Ashford would like to hear what the parties have to say.

What a lovely silt-stir this will create. I wish the Senate would get Judge Holmes back with the juniors, so he and Judge David Gustafson could provide me with more good blogfodder, while I couch-potato my way through the viral impasse.

We New York dirt lawyers well know the provisions of Article 14 of our Real Property Law, the Property Condition Disclosure Act. That enactment requires a seller of residential real property to give the purchaser a property condition disclosure statement (the “PCDS” referred to hereinabove, as my sequestered-in-style colleagues would say), or pay a mulct in lieu thereof.  A NY PCDS goes into exhaustive and exhausting detail about every condition of the property, inside and out, and is the buyer’s blueprint for a lawsuit. My form contract of sale awards the buyer the 500 Georges the statute requires, doesn’t represent that today is Thursday, and wishes the buyer a soldier’s farewell.

I don’t know if CA has a like mulct for non-compliance, but the sellers sure should have paid it, in Charles P. Littlejohn And Maxine M. Littlejohn, 2020 T. C. Memo. 42, filed 4/9/20.

This is another unsubstantiated deductions case. But I found it so reminiscent of single-family house purchases I’ve seen, or heard about. Charles and Maxine claim they were defrauded and robbed when their MacMansion fell apart.

Charles “…has a law degree and previously taught law at the Southern California Institute of Law in Santa Barbara.” 2020 T. C. Memo. 42, at p. 3. Ex-Ch J Michael B (“Iron Mike”) Thornton doesn’t say what Charles taught, but somehow I doubt that real property, tax, and trial techniques were on the menu.

There’s some back-and-fill about deductions for the two rental jobs Charles ran for Maxine, but given “the voluminous materials petitioners have provided,” 2020 T. C. Memo. 43, at p. 19, ex-Ch J Iron Mike manages to Cohanize a few kopeks for Charles over what IRS allowed. “Bearing heavily against petitioners, who have created this evidentiary quagmire, we conclude that they have substantiated one-half of the total amounts that they report as payments” for some repairs. 2020 T. C. Memo. 43, at pp. 19-20.

Depreciation also comes in for a healthy helping of skepticism from ex-Ch J Iron Mike. Charles isn’t sure what Maxine’s basis is in one of the rental jobs. ”Petitioners contend that they are unable to produce all their receipts for the improvements to the Oak Hill property because, they say, most of their records, which had been stored on shelves in the [MacMansion] garage, were destroyed when the garage roof collapsed…. Consequently, petitioners assert, on the basis of Mr. Littlejohn’s testimony we should find that the cost of the improvements was at least $600,000. We are unpersuaded.” 2020 T. C. Memo. 43, at p. 23.

And it seems a lot of records did survive the Fall of the House of Littlejohn. “Notwithstanding petitioners’ claims about the destruction of their records, as noted they have in fact produced a great many documents in an effort to substantiate the cost of certain improvements and repairs to the Oak Hill property. These documents purport to substantiate a great many expenditures over a period stretching from January 1, 1997, to March 8, 2007. These documents obviously were not destroyed by the garage roof’s collapse in December 2007. Petitioners have not explained the selective availability of these documents or even exactly what documents they contend are missing from this period. Nor have they explained the absence of records for expenditures after December 2007, when the garage roof collapsed.” 2020 T. C. Memo. 43, at pp. 23-24.

While Charles and Maxine aren’t doing so well on ex-Ch J Iron Mike’s track, they’re running strong in the Taishoff Good Excuse Sweepstakes.

But the best comes when Charles and Maxine claim the theft loss for fraudulent reps in the CA iteration of the PCDS in the MacMansion deal.

Ex-Ch J Iron Mike reads CA law as requiring criminal theft before Section 165 comes in play. But all Charles and Maxine have is a default judgment for $150K against a contractor who did some pre-closing work. And a big settlement from seller and realtor.

Besides, civil default judgments, no matter what they allege, don’t establish criminal liability, at least in CA. CA lawyers, see 2020 T. C. Memo. 43, at pp. 31-32.

Anyway, at least in CA, failure to disclose defects in a building isn’t criminal. The only criminal cases are where contractors took money and absconded or diverted the money elsewhere than to the job. Mere commercial defaults aren’t criminal, unless you can prove intent.

Maybe Charles didn’t teach contract law either.

And for you valuation fans, check out Charles’ and Maxine’s trusty expert, whom I’ll call Andy. Andy knocked down the before-FMV of the MacMansion by $1,755,000. “Questioned at trial about this $1,755,000 discount, [Andy] offered no detailed explanation but rather stated that it was a ‘pretty close ball park’.” 2020 T. C. Memo. 43, at p. 41.

There’s more, but ex-Ch J Iron Mike draws the curtain. “In short, [Andy]’s expert report, based on unexplained assumptions and third-hand information, is insufficient to substantiate petitioners’ claimed theft loss. The record contains no other competent evidence by which to reliably measure or estimate the amount of any supposed theft loss.” 2020 T. C. Memo. 43, at p. 44.

Of course IRS has the Boss Hoss sign-off stiped in, and Charles’ and Maxine’s CPA just filled in the forms with what the clients gave him.

And we can stop here.

Judge Emin (“Eminent”) Toro heeds the plea of Sandra M. Conard, Docket 27571-10, filed 4/8/20, in the words of Jimmy Webb, as sung by Glenn Campbell.

Y’all will recall that Sandra got tagged with the 10% Section 72 early withdrawal whatever-it-is a month ago. No? The see my blogpost ”Rational Basis,” 3/10/20.

But this is not about that. Judge Eminent then slugged Sandra for the whole deficiency plus chops. Now Sandra claims she has a NOL carryback that would erase a lot of the deficiency.

And after a couple phoneathons (hi, Judge Holmes) wherein IRS supports Sandra’s plea, Judge Eminent vacates and sends the parties off to a Rule 155 beancount.

“The disposition of a motion under Rule 162 to vacate a decision rests within the Court’s discretion. Such motions are generally granted only upon a showing of unusual circumstances or substantial error, e.g., mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence, mistake, or other reason justifying relief. See, e.g., Rule1(a); Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b); Brannon’s of Shawnee, Inc. v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 999 (1978). After considering the parties’ arguments, Ms. Conard’s status as a self-represented taxpayer, and the record before the Court, we conclude that unusual circumstances justify vacating our March 10, 2020, Decision” Order, at p. 2..

Note there are two (count ‘em, two) orders of even date and even docket number. One vacates, the other amends.

Sorry to play the spoiler, but shouldn’t the motion be one to revise, not vacate? How can you amend an order that was vacated and set aside?

Must be the stress of the lockdown sequester. I think we all need a small vacation.

No, this is not a recipe for cleaning up Corona. Today we have Judge Goeke sticking Timothy J. Lewis, 154 T. C. 8, filed 4/8/20, for $15K out of the $222K whistleblower award he got, or 6.9%,  per sequestration formula.

IRS claims Tax Court has no jurisdiction to decide if an award should be subject to the 2011 Budget Control Act, as amended.

“Under section 7623(b)(4) we have jurisdiction to review the WBO’s determinations of whistleblower awards. The sequestration of petitioner’s award reduces the amount of the award. Our jurisdiction to review the WBO’s award determinations includes jurisdiction to review whether the WBO considered an inappropriate factor in making its award determination. Petitioner argues that the sequestration is an inappropriate factor. While respondent argues that the WBO merely followed the OMB’s guidance on the budget sequestration provisions, section 7623 confers on the WBO the sole statutory authority to determine whether a whistleblower is entitled to an award and, if so, the amount of the award. We are required to review the WBO’s determinations, including whether it properly exercised its discretion to follow any guidance given by the OMB and whether it appropriately applied the sequestration provisions. Accordingly, our jurisdiction under section 7623(b)(4) once invoked includes deciding whether the WBO properly applied the sequestration provisions to petitioner’s whistleblower award.” 154 T. C. 8, at pp. 22-23 (Footnote omitted).

Tim’s claim that the whistleblower money is a separate fund is a nonstarter, as collected proceeds are measuring tools for computing awards, not funding sources. So is the claim that the factors for determining the amount of the award are exclusive. See Reg. 301.7623-4(b). And whistleblower awards are not statutorily exempt from sequestration. So no abuse of discretion in sequestering.

Tim argues that target shifted treatment for the year after the audit sparked by Tim’s blowing, but Whistleblower 16158-14W puts paid to that. See my blogpost “Straightforward, Expansive, Useless,” 4/17/17.

There’s also argy-bargy about unused unified gift-estate credit when Target H died, but Target W will pay tax per Section 2204(a) on the credit shelter testamentary trust Target H set up, so no more proceeds for Tim to claim.

He may be quirky, but when it comes to “such rarefied heights of pure mathematics that it is said that there was no man in the scientific press capable of criticizing it,” Judge Mark V. Holmes is in his element.

And he combines his mathematics with a tale worthy of John Steinbeck in Howard V. Moore, Donor, a.k.a. Estate of Howard V. Moore, Deceased, Virgil L. Moore, Executor and Trustee, 2020 T. C. Memo. 40, filed 4/7/20.

The late Howard started in an AZ hardscrbble “…home thatched out of arrowweed, not that different from the precolonial homes of the local Native Americans.” 2020 T.C. Memo. 40, at p. 3. But he made his career as a leveler, one who made every valley exalted and the rough places plain, so the AZ farmers could irrigate, and got paid in land because cash money was nonexistent. By the time Howard met The Great Leveler, his net worth was in the millions, and his trusty attorney had put together five (count ‘em, five) trusts and a FLP, with loans and paperwork to hold together his dysfunctional family. Read Judge Holmes’ prose, and imagine what Steinbeck or O’Neill could do with this.

Howbeit, Howard’s whole aim was to save taxes, which torpedoes the whole shebang. No business purpose, no assets to preserve and manage, no creditors to swoop down and plunder, charitable contributions to be computed only after IRS audits the estate, and Howard sold the farm for $16 million at arms’-length, but lived there and kept managing until he died, about a year after all this estate planning stuff (which he did while in a hospice, and checked himself out to go home).

Judge Holmes’ aim seems to be to mix-and-match Sections 2033, 2035, 2036, 2043, and 2051, until he reduces all the gyrations to an equation. “The final equation: ((Either $5.3 million or $8.5 million + (.2 * value of farm at date of death)) – (money that left the estate between the time of the sale and Moore’s death)) + ((value of farm at date of death) – ((either $5.3 million or $8.5 million) + (.2 * value of farm at date of death))). We can then simplify the equation to: (The value of the farm at date of death) – (money that left the estate between the time of the sale and date of death).” 2020 T. C. Memo. 40, at p. 55.

For you who are mathematicians, or old enough to remember the Greyhound Bus slogan (“getting there is half the fun”), start at p. 42 and read on. As for me, “(W)hen the proofs, the figures, were ranged in columns before me, When I was shown the charts and diagrams, to add, divide, and measure…how soon unaccountable I became tired,” as a much finer writer than I put it.

And, as the headline of this blogpost says, Judge Holmes sends the parties off to the Rule 155 beancount with the understatement of the decade. “We have no doubt that computations will be difficult.” 2020 T. C. Memo. 40, at p. 63.

Roderick M. Campbell and C. Sandra Campbell, 2020 T. C. Memo. 41, filed 4/7/20, needed a big write-off in Year One to offset big gain in Year Two, so they took the advice of their trusty CPA, who steered them into a buy-wholesale-donate-retail deal run by another client (hereinafter “Z”) of said trusty CPA. Hence my allusion to Jerome Weidman’s 1962 vehicle that lifted Barbra Streisand to stardom.

Rod and CSan bought 3,432 eyeglass frames from Z for $50K, got an appraisal (whose defects Judge Ashford carefully exposes; see infra, as my high-priced colleagues would say from their Hamptons lockdowns), and donated same to Lions in Sight, a genuine 501(c)(3) whose motives were to provide eyeglasses for the impoverished but whose CWA (Contemporaneous Written Approval) fell as far short as IRS’ Section 6751(b) Boss Hoss sign-off (see infra). Only after the one-year hold, Rod and CSan claimed deduction of $225K.

The problem is the valuation. The initial appraiser appraised Z’s entire 340,000 eyeglass frames. Rod and CSan only bought 3,432 thereof. Rod’s and CSan’s were undifferentiated. The aim of Reg. Section 1.170A-13(c)(2)(i)(A) is to require an appraisal of the exact goods that Rod and CSan donated. But there was no way of telling from the appraisal of the whole what the part was worth, as there were different brands with different values, and no statement of which ones were in Rod’s and CSan’s bundle.

“Tellingly, the 349,629 eyeglass frames that [initial appraiser] valued varied in price between $37 and $80, yet petitioners could not discern whether Mr. Campbell’s 3,432 frames are from the low end of the price spectrum, the high end, or some varying combination. Indeed, the [post-contribution] appraisal highlights the primary defect of the [initial] appraisal. In the [post-contribution] appraisal, 39,709 of the 349,629 eyeglass frames were assigned a value of zero as of [initial appraisal date]. Might Mr. Campbell’s 3,432 frames been a part of the 39,709 frames?” 2020 T. C. Memo. 41, at p. 20.

“Tellingly?” Inventive, but a wee bit neologismical and Tom Swiftian.

And the argument that Rod and CSan had an undivided interest in the whole falls short. “…the offering memorandum does not reflect that prospective buyers will have a fractional interest; instead it recites that prospective buyers will have the opportunity to purchase one or more allotments of 3,432 eyeglass frames from a collection of 171,600 frames in [Z’s] possession. The bill of sale between Mr. Campbell and [Z] also does not memorialize the purchase of a fractional interest and it references an itemized inventory or merchandise list (although such a list is not attached to the bill of sale). Moreover, if Mr. Campbell indeed had a fractional interest he would not have had the unfettered right as the offering memorandum provided to (1) inspect or remove his frames and (2) donate his frames before the one-year holding period even to another charitable organization besides Lions in Sight.” 2020 T. C. Memo. 41, at pp. 21-22.

“We also agree with respondent…that the [initial] appraisal fails to provide ‘[a] description of the property in sufficient detail for a person who is not generally familiar with the type of property to ascertain that the property that was appraised is the property that was (or will be) contributed’. Sec. 1.170A-13(c)(3)(ii)(A), Income Tax Regs.” 2020 T. C. Memo. 41, at p. 22.

And substantial compliance doesn’t help, because IRS needs to know that the exact property being appraised is identical to what is being donated. That’s essential.

The Lions, pure of heart and clear of sight, didn’t say that no goods or services were provided. So the CWA is not a CYA.

Finally, Rod’s and CSan’s trusty CPA also participated in the deal that Z, also a client of trusty CPA, put together; trusty CPA wrote the offering memo, therefore is a promoter, so no good faith reliance.

But IRS stumbles at the last fence. The CPAF (Civil Penalty Approval Form) was too hastily prepared. “The Civil Penalty Approval Form, although properly signed and dated before the issuance of the notice of deficiency (the first formal communication of penalties to petitioners), does not show separate approval for the section 6662(a) and (h) penalties. The one-page form fails to state with any degree of specificity which penalties should be asserted (and are approved); indeed, all that the form states is that a ‘[p]enalty will be asserted with the … [y]ear.’ Section 6751(b)(1) would be meaningless if written supervisory approval of an unspecified penalty was sufficient; examining agents would be free to assert any type of penalty after written supervisory approval was given, an action that section 6751(b)(1) was designed to prevent. Consequently, since respondent has not proffered any other evidence that he complied with the procedural requirements of section 6751(b), petitioners are not liable for the section 6662(a) and (h) accuracy-related penalties.” 2020 T. C. Memo. 41, at pp. 32-33.

CPAFs can’t be issued on a wholesale basis either.

Aviators are not the only ones who need to run the checklist, no matter how familiar they are with the procedures, NOTAMs, FAA requirements, NTSB admonitions, operating manuals, and 14 CFR, applicable to their aircraft and intended use thereof.

Judge Courtney D (“CD”) Jones not only rightly abominates the sloppy and timid substitute for thought locution “and/or,” but makes sure that the Ogden Sunseteers get the Form 211 info to the classifiers (the operating types who scope the stuff out to separate the wheat from the cliché), and read and heed the classifiers’ adjurations. And the best way to do it is to run the checklist.

Here’s Mandy Mobley Li, Docket No. 5070-19W, filed 4/6/20, whose petition fails on summary J in a designated hitter from Judge CD.

Mandy Mobley claims target “…had filed false claims of rental income, dependent children, alimony paid, and mortgage interest” for two (count ‘em, two) tax years. Order, at p. 1.

Please pardon an old-time beaten-down, beaten-up, single-shingle “general practitioner with very limited experience and mediocre qualifications,” but just perhaps maybe so this is a family law thing gone wrong. Just sayin’, not fur nuthin’.

Howbeit, the Sunseteer on the case flipped it over to the classifier, who sent it back with an endorsement “checked the 211 against the returns for years at issue, no law violation and claims speculative.” Best of all, “(T)he classifier documented her findings and conclusions on a classification checklist, including her recommendation that the WBO reject petitioner’s claim.” Order, at p. 2.

The Sunseteer accepted the classifier’s statements, and sent off the final rejection, so labeled to start the thirty-day clock for petitioning, and forestall epistolary volleying.

Again Judge CD joins in rebuking the bureaucratic responsibility-ducking language of the form shootdown letter. ” The WBO’s form letter contained the same ‘and/or’ conjunction that led to a lack of clarity in Lacey v. Commissioner, 153 T.C. __, __ (slip op. at 33) (Nov. 25, 2019). In this case, the record establishes that all of the reasons stated in the letter are justified. So the general lack of clarity attendant to the “and/or” conjunction is inconsequential here. But the Court continues to be concerned that, in a closer case, this form text may create confusion when we review a summary rejection of a whistleblower claim. See Alber v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2020-20, at *8-9 n.5.” Order, at p. 2, footnote 5.

I’ve blogged both those cases. And Mandy Mobley’s complaint reminds me just a trifle of Christian Bernd Alber. See my blogpost “We Don’t Need Lacey,”1/30/20, which links to my original blogpost about Lacey.

Howbeit, the Ogden Sunseteers made sure the classifier ran the checklist and checked off the Magnificent Seven “(‘contain[s] specific * * * information’; ‘contain[s] * * * credible information’; provides “information that the whistleblower believes will lead to collected [tax] proceeds’; reports’”fail[ure] to comply with the internal revenue laws’; ‘identif[ies] the person(s) believed to have failed to comply with the internal revenue laws’; ‘provide[s] substantive information, including all available documentation’; and does not ‘provide speculative information.’” Order, at p. 4.

So clearly the Ogden Sunseteer eyeballed the classifier’s take, decided not to ship the matter on to Examination, performing thereby the evaluative process and making a clean administrative record.

Summary J for IRS.

Belongs on a Bottle, Not An Alimony Payment

Family lawyers should have rejoiced as 2017 became 2018, as their obsolete and oft-copied boilerplate concerning expiry of alimony payments when a child reaches the age of 18 years could no longer torpedo a Section 215 deduction. Because there were no more until maybe 2026. But they forgot the Bard of Avon’s warning: “The evil men do lives after them.”

Here’s Timothy Clinton Biddle, 2020 T. C. Memo. 39, filed 4/6/20. In Tim’s case, the divorce decree separated alimony (then deductible) and child support (nondeductible) into two separate amounts. But neither that nor the amendment thereto removed the septic clause that alimony would continue to be payable: “…until the occurrence of one of the following events: (1) the youngest child’s 18th birthday, (2) the wife or husband’s death, (3) the wife’s remarriage at the five-year point or anytime thereafter, or (4) the wife becomes self-supporting.” 2020 T. C. Memo. 39, at p. 4.

Tim says he and ex-Mrs Tim never intended the 18th birthday cut off. Too bad, says Judge Vasquez. “In defining alimony section 71(b) does not list the parties’ intent as a factor. Thus, the Court cannot rely on the intent of the parties in determining whether a payment should be characterized as alimony for Federal income tax purposes; it must apply the explicit requirements listed under section 71(b). Therefore, petitioner’s argument that the parties intended that the designated alimony payments would continue indefinitely, regardless of the contingency relating to his youngest child’s 18th birthday, is unavailing. That the designated alimony payments were also subject to termination contingencies relating to petitioner’s ex-spouse does not change this result.” 2020 T. C. Memo. 39, at p. 8. (Citation omitted, but Judge Vasquez cites a case I blogged in my blogpost “The Phone Call,” 4/15/14.).

Creating separate pockets of dollars and labeling one “child support” and the other “alimony” doesn’t prevent Section 71(c)(2) from tearing off the labels and picking both pockets.

IRS magnanimously spares Tim, pro se, retired military, the Section 6662 chops.

Dear family lawyers, leave the 18 year olds in the drinks cabinet. And save a wee dram for me.

Looks like IRS is up to its old tricks, dropping the SNOD after the petition, and trying to knock out the valid petition by claiming it duplicates the untimely one, then dismissing the untimely one on lateness grounds. I’ve blogged this more than once before now, but the grandma of these is “Another Taishoff ‘Oh Please,’” 9/24/14.

Ch J Maurice B (“Mighty Mo”) Foley plays today’s version like the speedy third baseman who races to the bunt and nails the lead runner with a bullet throw (I remember Billy Cox of the old Brooklyn Dodgers making a similar play against the Yankees more than 60 years ago; holy canoli, what about the baseball season, with this COVID-19?).

Back to work. Here’s Steven Lindsey & Shannan Lindsey, filed 4/6/20, with two docket Nos., namely, viz., and two wit, 826-20 and 1396-20. The numbers matter.

Ch J Mighty Mo is on the case, with the numbers and dates firmly in mind. Do thou likewise.

“On January 13, 2020, petitioners filed a petition with the Court, at docket No. 826-20, challenging the notice of deficiency dated October 21, 2019, issued to them for taxable year 2017.The fling fee in that case was paid. On January 22, 2020,petitioners filed timely a second petition, at docket No. 1396-20, challenging the same notice of deficiency for 2017. The filing fee in that case was not paid. On April 3, 2020, respondent filed, at docket No. 1396-20, a Motion To Close on Ground of Duplication seeking to close that case as duplicative of the case at docket No. 826-20. In his motion to close respondent states that petitioners do not object to the granting of the motion.” Order, at p.1.

As a docket search shows Steve & Shannan are pro sese, no surprise they didn’t pick up on the fact that IRS was torpedoing their valid petition and floating away their untimely one.

But Ch J Mighty Mo will have none of it. He tosses IRS’ motion to toss the timely for duplication, and tosses the untimely in its stead.

Even better, he credits the filing fee paid for the untimely to the surviving timely.

Does Ch J Mighty Mo read this my blog? I suggested this very thing in my blogpost “Fake Out – Part Deux,” 6/23/15.