IRS can’t muster clear and convincing proof that la famille Foote, hawkers of “…aircraft engines and engine parts for use in military vehicles, including helicopters, airplanes, and tanks,” were actual fraudsters.

The Footes ran an outfit called Transsuport, which “… primarily purchased surplus parts from the Government in bulk lots that contained parts having little value as well as parts that petitioner wanted for its business. Petitioner bought the lots to acquire items that it expected to sell but ended up with items that would not be sold. The costs of particular items were not specified as part of the purchase transactions.” 2015 T. C. Memo. 179, at p. 4.

Judge Cohen’s opinion may be found in Transupport, 2015 T. C. Memo. 179, filed 9/14/15.

A lot of what the Footes bought couldn’t be sold because obsolete or banged-up.

The Footes never bothered with inventory. IRS nailed the Footes for 10 years’ worth of deficiencies, but seven (count ‘em, seven) of those would be off the table because of SOL, unless fraud.

The Footes had their returns prepared by Elaine Thompson. “Thompson was a certified public accountant (C.P.A.), was a name partner in her firm, and was the first female president of the Connecticut Society of Certified Public Accountants.” 2015 T. C. Memo. 179, at p. 5.

Interesting that Ms. Thompson was a CT CPA when the Footes’ operations were in New Hampshire.

Anyway, her firm worked off the Footes’ handwritten summaries, audited nothing, and advised the Footes that inventory creates income. The Footes apparently took that to mean they shouldn’t do it.

And when the Footes wanted to flog their cash cow, they put out a private placement memo boasting of their huge profits, even when some of what they bought was unsaleable.

Nothing like buying stuff from the government at scrap prices and reselling it for a ton of money.

One of the flogees, apparently disgusted by this, dropped a Form 211 Whistleblower on the Ogden Sunseteers, and IRS descended upon the Footes.

IRS clearly and convincingly proves that the Footes overstated their cost of goods sold and understated their income and thus their taxes.

But where are the other badges of fraud, beloved the judges?

IRS responds with the Sierra Madre defense: “We don’t need no stinkin’ badges!”

“Respondent argues that fraud has been proven directly in this case and that, therefore, the Court need not rely upon the badges of fraud typically used to determine intent where direct proof of fraudulent intent is unavailable. See, e.g., Bradford v. Commissioner, 796 F.2d 303, 307 (9th Cir. 1986) (setting forth factors or “badges” of fraud), aff’g T.C. Memo. 1984-601. Respondent’s argument, however, rests on the assertion that petitioner realized a 75% gross profit on sales of surplus parts, as claimed by Foote who knowingly represented to petitioner’s tax preparer that the gross profit percentage was substantially less. Respondent relies heavily on the sales materials attributable to petitioner that boasted about the favorable tax results from writing off ‘the majority of inventory as purchased’. The Recast Financial Summary presented on petitioner’s behalf to prospective purchasers assumed a 75% profit on ‘general part sales’ and a nonobsolete inventory on hand exceeding $100 million cost.” 2015 T. C. Memo. 179, at pp. 18-19.

“The statements made orally and in writing to prospective purchasers of petitioner’s business by petitioner’s representatives are admissions of the taxpayer that may be considered as evidence. Such admissions are not conclusive, and they are not more likely to be truthful than any other uncorroborated statements of interested persons. In the context in which they were made, those boastful statements have no more guarantees of truthfulness than the tax return reporting. The attitude of petitioner’s officers was best expressed by W. Foote during his testimony about the Honeywell list: ‘Accuracy was not important. It’s a sales document. They can choose to accept it or not accept it, but it’s on them to come and actually verify what they think we have versus what we actually have.’” 2015 T. C. Memo. 179, at pp. 19-20.

“Although petitioner was required to and failed to keep inventory records, the nature of its business of acquiring surplus parts through bulk purchases and keeping them for years in the hope that many would ultimately be sold provides a plausible nonfraudulent explanation of those failures. Petitioner’s employees did not think that the effort to keep reliable inventories was worth the trouble. They were wrong, and this case should convince them otherwise. However, so far as the record reflects, neither the IRS agents conducting earlier exams nor petitioner’s accountant made clear the consequences of failing to do what they should have been doing. No adjustments were made or suggested during the early audits or the annual review by the accountant. So far as the record reflects, petitioner was not clearly advised to find a method to write off obsolete parts as a means of legitimately reducing the inventory value.” 2015 T. C. Memo. 179, at p. 21.

Besides, the Footes didn’t hide anything from IRS, contrary to what IRS’s counsel claims. They did come up with a lot of self-serving testimony. While the Court can kick self-serving testimony, to prove fraud, the testimony must be demonstrably false. And this wasn’t.

Not to forget there was their highly-credentialed accountant, who seems to have snowed the IRS examination team.

“Acquiescence in petitioner’s methodology by its well-credentialed C.P.A., which apparently satisfied successive IRS examiners, may well have lulled petitioner’s principals into thinking that what they were doing would pass muster for tax reporting purposes even if the economics of the business were better than reported. In this context, their open and puffing statements to prospective purchasers are reconcilable with their current explanations. There is no clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.” 2015 T. C. Memo. 179, at p. 23.

Though the evidence falls short of clear and convincing proof of fraud, the Footes are not exonerated thereby.

And IRS’s examination team gets a slap from Judge Cohen.

“The actions or inactions of petitioner’s accountants and the IRS auditors, however, included no clear warnings to petitioner that its conduct was illegal or fraudulent. To the extent that none of these professionals undertook the task of determining petitioner’s correct income, they were complicit in the duration of the improper reporting. This case is before the Court only because the IRS’ acquiescence in petitioner’s methodology ended when a whistleblower saw an opportunity for an informant’s reward.” 2015 T. C. Memo. 179, at p. 25.

Wanna bet what said whistleblower gets when the Ogden Sunseteers get through with him?

Anyway, the Footes are off the hook for the first seven years, but the next three are up for grabs.

But I Won’t Do That

And the reason why is that I don’t have jurisdiction. So like Meatloaf in Jim Steinman’s 1993 hit song (released just 22 years ago tomorrow), Judge Cohen must reject the plea of Annamalai Annamalai & Parvathi Siva Annamalai, Docket No. 15887-13, filed 9/14/15, although which of them is suffering in durance vile is not stated.

Here’s the Annamalai tale.

“On September 9, 2015, petitioners’ Emergency Motion to Request for an Order From the Court to Order the Detention Facility to Place Him Out of Segregation Hole was filed. This document is not an appropriate motion to file with this Court in that it seeks relief that is not available within the limited jurisdiction of this Court.” Order, at p. 1.

So whichever (or both) Annamalai is incarcerated in the “Segregation Hole,” Judge Cohen can’t help.

We all have heard in extenso the political debate about the free speech of corporations, whose personhood the Supremes blessed in 558 U.S. 310 (2010). Believe me, in this non-political blog I’m not crossing that Rubicon, whatever my off-the-blog opinions.

But The Judge with a Heart, STJ Armen, must grapple with the question whether a single-member LLC, disregarded though it may be for income tax purposes, is really a person. And he gets this conundrum in Car Werks LLC., David M. Palmer, Sole Member, Docket No. 12067-15L, 9/11/15.

Dave petitions a NOD, but it’s a NOD directed to his LLC, although IRS may want TFRPs from Dave for FICAs owing from the LLC.

The NOD is directed to the LLC and has the LLC’s TIN on it, but some other stuff as well. The NFTL is also directed to the LLC.

But Dave claims $350K in damages from IRS, who, his counsel claims, is trying to “extort him.”

STJ Armen: “In the instant case the nub of the complaint consistently voiced by counsel who subscribed the petition is that it was David M. Palmer in his individual capacity who was injured by the filing of the lien and that it is David M. Palmer in his individual capacity who is the petitioner seeking redress. But respondent maintains that no lien was ever filed against David M. Palmer in his individual capacity and that no notice of determination has been sent to him in his individual capacity. On the other hand, it is alleged in the petition that the IRS ‘filed a lien against Carwerks and taxpayer’s private property.’ (Emphasis added.).” Order, at pp. 5-6.

But it doesn’t get easier for STJ Armen.

“Complicating the matter further is the fact that the notice of Federal tax lien that was filed with the Secretary of State for the State of Montana in Helena, Montana was filed in the name of ‘Car Werks LLC, David Palmer, Sole MBR’, and reflects a ‘residence’ address on Brooks Street in Missoula, MT. In contrast, the April 16, 2015 Notice Of Determination was issued simply to ‘Car Werks LLC’ at a PO Box in Missoula, MT. As the Court understands the Commissioner’s regulations, a single-member LLC (such as Car Werks LLC) is treated as a corporation under the ‘check-the-box’ regulations for employment tax purposes for wages paid on or after September 14, 2009. See secs. 301.7701- 2(c)(2)(iv), 301.7701-2(e)(5)(ii), Proced. & Admin. Regs. If this is true, then it is not clear why respondent would have identified David M. Palmer in the notice of Federal tax lien when respondent did not do so in the Notice Of Determination and whether the inclusion of Mr. Palmer’s name on the notice of Federal tax lien was improper.” Order, at p. 6. (Footnote omitted).

How to decide whether the party liened on is Dave, the LLC, or both? Or whether Dave is the LLC and the LLC is Dave?

STJ Armen tells both sides to send in every piece of paper they’ve got (except what they’ve already filed) that bears upon the years at issue, to whomsoever the piece of paper was addressed. And the IRS has more homework.

“Further, respondent [IRS] shall state in his response whether (in respondent’s view) naming David M. Palmer on the notice of Federal tax lien and filing the notice of Federal tax lien in the name of ‘Car Werks LLC, David Palmer, Sole MBR’ was consistent with the regulations cited in the preamble to this Order and, regardless, whether such notice of Federal tax lien appropriately named ‘David Palmer, Sole MBR’ if the taxpayer against whom the lien was filed was Car Werks LLC; and if (in respondent’s view) the inclusion of Mr. Palmer’s name on the notice of Federal tax lien was appropriate, why it was so if the assessment giving rise to the lien was made against Car Werks LLC. Finally, respondent shall explain in his response the ‘residence’ address reference in such notice of Federal tax lien.” Order, at pp. 7-8.

Oh yes, here’s a practice tip for Dave’s counsel. “The parties are further advised that if the Court were to conclude that it has jurisdiction to proceed in this case on the merits, then the Court shall sua sponte strike from the petition the last sentence of paragraph 4 of the petition (‘Taxpayer seeks $350,000 in damages from IRS for malicious lien filing.’) as this Court lacks jurisdiction to award monetary damages in a collection action.” Order, at p. 8.

Doesn’t Cut It in Tax Court

That’s the bad news Judge Haines has for Ronald Craig Fish, 2015 T. C. Memo. 176, filed 9/10/15. Ron is a semi-retired patent attorney, so he tries the public policy gambit when IRS nails him for taking losses in his trad IRA against a distribution, without liquidating the entire IRA.

“Petitioner advances various tax policy arguments which he believes support this position. For example, he contends that restricting an IRA holder’s ability to deduct a loss that occurs when an investment held by the IRA is sold thwarts congressional intent to encourage individuals to save for retirement. He also claims that requiring retirees to completely liquidate their IRAs in order to recognize a deductible loss is ‘unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious and completely unworkable for savers dependent upon IRA/SEP income for their retirement.’

“While petitioner may not agree with the way the law is written and may have reasons that he believes support changing the law, we cannot do that for him. Tax policy is within Congress’ purview, not within this Court’s. We decide cases on the basis of the law enacted by Congress rather than a taxpayer’s policy arguments as to how the law should have been written.” 2015 T. C. Memo. 176, at pp. 4-5.

Take it up with Congress, Ron, and the best of luck to you.

Ron tries to equate a trad IRS with a passthrough, but that doesn’t pass. It’s a tax-exempt, not a passthrough (which is taxable).

Judge Haines: “Transactions occurring within the IRA do not result in taxable events which are reported on the holder’s individual income tax return. An IRA is a tax-exempt entity, not a passthrough entity. Sec. 408(e)(1). The law is clear that distributions from and payments out of an IRA trigger income tax consequences for the payee or distributee. Sec. 408(d).” 2015 T. C. Memo. 176, at p. 5.

And Ron can’t avoid the 20% five-and-ten chop, either. His arguments aren’t authority.

Another case of a lawyer enmeshed in the toils of Tax Court. The “small court” isn’t so easy.

Once again we examine the magic date when a debt is deemed uncollectible, thereby relieving the debtor of the indebtedness and sparking a Form 1099-C. But here is the difference: what effort is appropriate to ascertaining that date?

Nothing particularly new in this T. C. Memo, Patricia D. Clark, 2015 T. C. Memo. 175, filed 9/9/15. The issue is whether an identifiable event occurred manifesting that efforts to collect the debt were abandoned.

There’s more on this subject in my blogpost “Sunk by the Navy?” 9/28/11. Judge Cohen cites the Kleber case in this opinion.

Pat defaulted on her auto loan, the car got sold for less than the outstanding balance plus collection fees, the note was sold, and five (count ‘em, five) different collection agencies tried (or maybe didn’t try too hard) to collect from Pat.

Finally, the note holder unloaded a Form 1099-C on Pat, but it came back “undeliverable.”

IRS unloaded a SNOD on Pat, for $1,472.00. And thereby hangs the tale.

Pat claims the debt became uncollectible years before the creditor unloaded the 1099-C.

“There is a rebuttable presumption that an identifiable event has occurred during a calendar year if a creditor has not received a payment on a debt at any time during a testing period ending at the close of the year. Sec. 1.6050P- 1(b)(2)(iv), Income Tax Regs. The testing period is generally a 36-month period.” 2015 T. C. Memo. 175, at p. 7.

Of course, rebuttable presumptions are made to be rebutted.

IRS claims the engagement of the five (count ‘em, five) collection agencies shows that collection activities kept going on until the year when the 1099-C was unloaded.

But IRS falls short.

Judge Cohen: “ While respondent has established that collection agencies were engaged, the evidence does not demonstrate what, if any, collection activities they undertook. Respondent has therefore failed to provide any evidence of any significant, bona fide activity that would indicate an active creditor and thus has failed to rebut the presumption that an identifiable event discharging petitioner’s debt occurred….” 2015 T. C. Memo. 175, at p. 9.

Which gives rise to the title of this blogpost. How much time and effort would it take to amass evidence of all the collection activities undertaken by these agencies (assuming that they were still in business and had their records available), and provide such evidence in admissible form?

If this problem were posed to a private law firm, they might well ask whether, whatever effort was required, was it worth expending for a $1,472.00 claim?

Not quite Cyndi Lauper, but echoing her signature song, is The Great Dissenter, a/k/a The Judge Who Writes Like a Human Being, s/a/k/a The Implacable, Imperturbable, Irrefrangable, Indefatigable, Inimitable, Incontrovertible and Incomparable Foe of the Partitive Genitive, Judge Mark V. Holmes, back from summer hols and rarin’ to go with a small-claimer, David William Laudon, 2015 T. C. Sum. Op. 54, filed 9/8/15.

DW is a traveling Minnesota chiropractor. Among his other accomplishments, DW “…made nearly $290,000 in bank deposits from 2007 to 2009 yet reported only a bit less than $210,000 in gross receipts on his returns. He deducted as business expenses for his chiropractic home office a Microsoft Xbox 360, Nintendo Wii, and numerous pieces of hair-salon equipment. He also claimed deductions for driving tens of thousands of miles throughout Minnesota and the Dakotas–both to treat patients and to perform an assortment of other services.” 2015 T. C. Sum. Op. 54, at pp. 1-2.

IRS, not amused, blows away most of DW’s claimed deductions and wants accuracy chops.

DW is nothing if not unusual. “Laudon testified that he also makes ‘house calls’ and reported that he racked up between 40,000 and 60,000 miles per year in his business vehicles. He said that his patients often called him a psychiatrist, chauffeur, physician, peace officer, or even a pheasant hunter.” 2015 T. C. Sum. Op 54, at p. 2. (Footnote omitted, but it gave me the title for this blogpost.).

“But not a ghostbuster. The Commissioner rhetorically asserted that some of Laudon’s trips might have made more sense if he was claiming to be a ghostbuster. Laudon then disclaimed any employment as a ghostbuster. In his reply brief the Commissioner conceded that Laudon was not ‘employed or under contract to perform work as a ghostbuster during the tax years at issue in this case.’ We therefore need make no finding on the existence of a market for ‘supernatural elimination’ in west-central Minnesota. See ‘Ghostbusters’ (Columbia Pictures 1984).” 2015 T. C. Sum. Op. 54, Footnote 2, at pp. 2-3.

Fortunately Minnesota is not subject to the jurisdiction of the Seventh Circuit, or these attempts at humor might fall foul of that acerbic jurist, Judge Posner. See my blogpost “There Goes the Neighborhood,” 9/3/13.

Of course, IRS was represented by that formidable legal scholar, John Schmittdiel, Esq. Scholar John was diploma’ed by no less than Judge James S. (“Big Jim”) Halpern in my blogpost “Go To the Head of the Class,” 3/26/14. I had no idea that Scholar John was a stand-up comic as well.

But seriously, folks, DW’s wanderings and peculiar deductions fail for want of substantiation.

“While we accept that Laudon treated patients in his home at least some of the time, we don’t find credible his testimony that his basement was used exclusively for his business. We particularly disbelieve his claim that the Xbox, Wii, big-screen TVs, and other electronics in his basement were used exclusively for chiropractic purposes since this claim conflicts with his much more plausible admission to the IRS examiner during audit that his daughter and his girlfriend’s son would play these video games while he was on the phone.” 2015 T. C Sum. Op. 54, at p. 10. (Footnote omitted).

Once again, the footnote is for fun. “Laudon further undermined his credibility by claiming that he used the Wii and Xbox 360 to keep his patients ‘active and moving.’ These are well-known games whose features are not subject to reasonable dispute and are ‘generally known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction.’ Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(1). One can imagine the Wii–with games such as Wii Bowling and Wii Fit that feature motion-based controllers requiring physical activity from its users–might be used for its physical benefits. But no reasonable person could think that the Xbox 360 could be–Microsoft didn’t introduce the Kinect until late 2010, just in time for Christmas and before the years at issue in this case. Before Kinect, Xbox playing was more of the vegging-out-on-the-couch variety.” 2015 T. C. Sum. Op. 54, at p. 10, Footnote 5.

DW is out, but Judge Holmes certainly had fun. But let’s leave the humor to Steven Colbert’s debut tonight.

Rather hard to sparkle on the Friday before Labor Day, with the thermometer in the mid-eighties and the humidity at palpable. It’s just past six p.m., EDST, and my personal rule is that, if I’m not up with a post by that hour (local time), I’ve lost the day.

So I am casting about for something wherewith to sparkle, and candor compels me to state there ain’t a lot.

It seems that most of the 400 Second Street, NW, Glasshousers have hit the trail for barbecue.

The Ogden Sunseteers have unloaded Publications 5232 and 5232-A, each a one-page beginner’s guide to the giant slalom and moguls of Section 7623. To encourage potential blowers, the Ogden crew provides the following: “It frequently takes 5 to 7 years, or more, for the Whistleblower Office to make a decision about a claim.” Somewhat reminiscent of the old tale about the Czar, the despised one, the poodle dog and the French language.

But read it all for yourselves. http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p5232.pdf and http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p5232a.pdf

The latter is an explanation of what happens to a claims for a whistleblower award. In further explication thereof, see Thomas Heggen’s 1946 novel Mr. Roberts, specifically that portion relating to how Mr Roberts imagined his applications for transfer were treated by Navy Bureau of Personnel.

But that Obliging Jurist, Judge David Gustafson, bless him, has a designated hitter, Avet Coach Corp., Docket No. 25052-07L, filed 9/4/15.

Basically, petitioner’s counsel bails, to the unanimous agreement of all parties. But counsel bails after a telephone conference initiated by Judge Gustafson, when IRS moved for summary J and no answer came from petitioner or counsel aforesaid.

After said teleconfab, counsel bailed by mail. Judge Gustafson gets testy, which is happening more often, it seems; I hope these rulebreakers aren’t wearing him down.

“…after the Court initiated a telephone conference with counsel for both parties, petitioner’s counsel mailed… a motion to withdraw as counsel. (This mailing was not in compliance with the Court’s procedures requiring electronic filing. As a result, the undersigned judge’s receipt of the motion was delayed by several days. Petitioner’s counsel is admonished to comply with the Court’s procedures in the future.) The motion states that neither petitioner nor respondent objects to the motion to withdraw.” Order, at p. 1.

So Amvet will appear by an officer, to whom Judge Gustafson addresses one of his shotgun orders, directing said officer to answer IRS’s summary J motion a week before calendar call, at which said calendar call the motion will be argued. And it’s answer and argue, or go home.

And as said calendar call is coming to a venue near me, I shall show up thereat, notwithstanding my midnight departure next day for Berlin and the Eisbären, the First Floor Restaurant and KaDeWe.

Cain’t hardly wait.

No, not the theme song from Mondo Cane, a 1962 pseudo-documentary, which tune produced any number of wedding singers’ outpourings. I must have danced, or waddled, through dozens of such, as friends took the plunge.

Rather, this is another example of defects of the “shoebox” gambit, as disclosed by that Obliging Jurist, Judge David Gustafson, in a designated hitter, Jean Michel Cazabat, Docket No. 2271-14, filed 9/3/15.

JMC and IRS were dueling over document production. The principal bone of contention was JMC’s response to IRS’s demands that he fork over substantiation of four classes of business expenses. JMC claimed he had, but IRS wasn’t best pleased with JMC’s response.

“For each of these four classes of requested documents, petitioner responded that responsive documents ‘were enclosed with Petitioner’s proposed Stipulation of Facts as’ a specified exhibit. Respondent replies: ‘In response, petitioner referred respondent to voluminous bank and credit card periodic statements he had provided earlier. Respondent respectfully requests that petitioner be compelled to indicate, in a meaningful way, how the proffered documents support the expenses.’” Order, at p. 2.

Judge Gustafson finds IRS is right: “Without having the documents in front of us, we surmise that respondent is reasonable in asking for citations. A petitioner could not carry his burden of proof to substantiate deductions by submitting unexplained bank and credit card statements as evidence and then expecting the Court to puzzle through them and link the entries thereon. He would need to give testimony, presumably aided by a spreadsheet or other demonstrative exhibit, that would show the relevance of specific entries. In the right circumstance, a ‘summary’ under Fed. R. Evid. 1006 might be expedient. In any event, petitioner would need to offer more than his raw bank and credit card statements, and respondent is entitled to obtain that ‘more’ in discovery.” Order, at p. 2.

Most of the rest of the fight is over the Section 7525 adviser privilege, and Judge Gustafson finds JMC blew it. IRS refers to “various affidavits” wherein JMC’s adviser discussed communications with and to JMC.

Just a tad testy (for such an Obliging Jurist) at IRS’s want of specificity (“It would have been helpful if respondent had given specific citations to these ‘various affidavits’, which were apparently filed before the undersigned judge had jurisdiction over this case….” Order, at pp. 2-3), nevertheless Judge Gustafson obliges IRS by finding a couple paragraphs (hi, Judge Holmes) in an affidavit wherein said adviser advises all and sundry that JMC handed him everything he needed to prepare the return in question, that what he got enabled him to prepare a true and complete return, and that JMC never intended to understate income or tax due therefrom.

“It does appear, as respondent argues, that whatever privilege may have initially attached to communications between petitioner and Mr. X has indeed been waived.” Order, at p. 3. (Name omitted). If you’re going to argue reliance on your adviser, everything is a free-fire zone.

There’s more, but you get the idea.

If you petition a SNOD and your petition hits Judge Paris’ desk, she’ll give you an opinion, whether you want it or not.

Back from a vacation and a visit to Citifield, home of the Amazin’s, which is why this blogpost is being written in the midnight hour, I need to satisfy my readers, few but worthy.

So here’s William Alan Gay, Docket No. 10096-14, filed 9/2/15.

Wm Alan moved to dismiss his petition because IRS allegedly failed to participate in discovery, and anyway Wm Alan got a discharge in bankruptcy.

Nobody told Judge Paris about the bankruptcy, and it seems she is a trifle miffed at this omission. Post-petition and pre-discharge, IRS hit Wm Alan with a First Demand for Admissions. This Judge Paris tosses summarily.

But the automatic stay in 11 USC §362(a)(8) expires with the granting of a discharge. So if the debt is discharged, why go on with the case?

Well, Judge Paris will tell you why, even though Wm Alan wants out.

“… the Court does not regard ‘the dischargeability of the tax obligation’ to be an issue before us at this time, as the instant action is not a collection action under I .R .C. section 6330(d) but rather one for redetermination under I.R.C. section 6213(a). …prior to this bankruptcy filing, petitioner filed a timely petition in response to a Notice of Deficiency, dated April 14, 2014, for his taxable years 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010, which invoked the jurisdiction of this Court. Accordingly, the tax and penalties in issue had not been assessed, but are assessable subject to the outcome of this case. Therefore, the Court’s jurisdiction to determine whether petitioner’s tax liabilities were discharged in the bankruptcy proceeding need not be answered as a prerequisite to deciding the substantive merits of the income tax issues presented in this case.” Order, at pp. 1-2.

And of course our old chum Settles says you can’t dismiss a timely petition from a SNOD without giving IRS a win. See my blogpost “Dismissed!”, 5/8/12.

But Judge Paris tells Wm Alan he can’t dismiss his petition. Why Judge Paris comes to this conclusion eludes me. Suppose Wm Alan concedes IRS was right and the SNOD is 100% valid. But if the indebtedness arising therefrom was discharged in bankruptcy, why should Wm Alan or anyone else care? So why waste time with a motion for entry of decision, when a simple dismissal does the same thing?

Ah, the anfractuosities of Tax Court practice. Let’s decide if the SNOD is correct, even if the indebtedness arising therefrom was discharged in bankruptcy.

I’ve noticed a trend in restaurants, where servers will not issue separate checks to a group of diners. It may be the advent of computerized billing, or a disinclination to do arithmetic for their patrons. This leads either to splitting by the diners, or advanced mathematical calculations lasting almost as long as the meal.

But, attorneys and USTCPs, take note: Tax Court requires separate checks. Thus spake Ch J. Michael B. (“Iron Mike”) Thornton, in Gary Miller & Connie Miller, Docket No. 17074-15, filed 9/1/15, a very dull day at 400 Second Street, NW.

See to what I have been reduced, finding blogfodder in such trivia.

“…the Entry of Appearance by A and B was filed in this case. The Court did not recognize B as counsel of record for the petitioners because the entry of appearance was eFiled by A. Each practitioner is required to electronically file a separate entry of appearance.” Order, at p. 1. (Names omitted).

It might be well if there were a Tax Court rule so stating, but Rule 24(3) is ambiguous: “(3) Subsequent Appearance: Where counsel has not previously appeared, counsel shall file an entry of appearance in duplicate, signed by counsel individually, containing the name and docket number of the case, the name, mailing address, telephone number, and Tax Court bar number of counsel so appearing, and a statement that counsel is admitted to practice before the Court. A separate entry of appearance, in duplicate, shall be filed for each additional docket number in which counsel shall appear.”

The Rule doesn’t state that each counsel must file a separate Entry of Appearance. The only mention of separate entries of appearance is in case of multiple docket numbers. If the requisite information for each counsel appears on one page, even if eFiled, does that not satisfy the Rule?

And Form 7 states only that separate entries of appearance are required for separate docket numbers.

Well, perhaps the hard-laboring clerks at 400 Second Street, NW, really want separate checks.