STJ Lewis (“The Name That Resounds”) Carluzzo reprises his 7/20/13 performance (“Yes, We Have No Jurisdiction”) in Charles R. Barrett, Docket No. 21310-14SL, filed 5/13/15.

Charlie paid (via levy and some cash he kicked in) what IRS claims is his outstanding debt to the Nation With Liberty and Justice For All. So STJ Lew has an off-the-bencher small-claimer to send Charlie on his way.

IRS dinged Charlie with a SNOD for one year, Charlie never petitioned, so IRS levied on his Social Security, but Charlie never petitioned that either.

So IRS dinged Charlie for the next year. Same story, but Charlie claims the NITL wasn’t sent to his last known address, though IRS stoutly maintains they mailed it there.

STJ Lew doesn’t have to go there.

Charlie went to Collection Appeals, which we all know is CDP ultra-light, because you can’t get to Tax Court from there. If not sure of this proposition, see my blogpost “An Appeal Is Not Due Process,” 9/16/13.

But Charlie got a closing letter, anyway, claims that’s a NOD, and petitions from that.

It’s not a NOD, says STJ Lew, wearily.

“As we have noted in countless opinions and orders too numerous to count, the Court is a court of limited jurisdiction, and we may exercise judgment only to the extent authorized by Congress. See Naftel v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 527, 529 (1985).

“We are satisfied that the closing letter is not a sufficient determination to establish the Court’s jurisdiction over petitioner’s …liabilities under Section 6330(d), and in the absence of such a determination we are without jurisdiction in this case, which apparently was commenced under that section….. According to respondent, respondent has made no other determinations, or failed to take any action, that would otherwise support the Court’s jurisdiction over the matters contained in the petition. Because petitioner is not able to establish otherwise, we are further satisfied that we have no jurisdiction in this matter under any provision of the Internal Revenue Code.” Order, at pp. 6-7. (Citations omitted).

Now STJ Lew can toss the petition because there is no NOD, or he can toss it because IRS never sent the NITL to Charlie’s last known address.

And it does matter, because if not sent to last known address, as we have heard again and again, the NITL is a nullity and the levy is improper, so Charlie walks.

But Charlie, by virtue of the levy and some bucks he kicked in along the way, doesn’t owe IRS.

“Under the circumstances of this case, however, it matters not upon which ground the dismissal is based because the …liability has been paid. Even if the forced collection of petitioner’s … liability was inconsistent with the procedures contemplated in Sections 6320 and/or 6330, and we make no finding on the point, we would be powerless to provide petitioner with a remedy or the refund that he seeks. After all, if we have no authority to order a refund in a Section 6330(d) case over which we properly have jurisdiction, see Green-Thapedi v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 1 (2006), then we most certainly have no such refund authority in a case such as this where we are without jurisdiction. Our lack of jurisdiction also renders moot petitioner’s request for injunctive relief. Our authority to enjoin the collection of a federal tax in a Section 6330(d) case arises only if the Court properly has jurisdiction in that case.” Order, at p. 8.

But Charlie, don’t lose hope. There might be another way.

“Lastly, we think it also appropriate to note that nothing in this bench opinion, or the order to be entered as a result, should be taken as a comment on whether petitioner is entitled to the relief he seeks here in proceedings, administrative or otherwise, available to him under other provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.” Order, at p. 9.

Go for it, Charlie.